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This Essay looks at the state of the law in England as it was when Lord Gordon Slynn of
Hadley was practicing at the bar. The Essay then considers state liability in the context of the









In the nature of things, from time to time, those put in 
authority by the state will misuse powers which they have been 
given, use powers which they have not been given, or fail to carry 
out duties which have been laid upon them. The question then 
arises: what can be done about this? 
A topic which exists in all jurisdictions is the extent of the 
liability in damages of the state for wrongful administrative 
action. Should damages lie where they fall? Or should the courts 
attempt to balance the interests of aggrieved claimants against 
the fact that potential liability will create a burden on resources 
and might adversely affect the manner in which the 
administration carries out its duties? Is there a distinction 
between administrative action or inaction which was unlawful and 
action or inaction which was merely substandard? This is a topic to 
which Gordon Slynn made a number of different contributions 
as counsel, Advocate General, and judge. 
This Essay looks at the state of the law in England as it was 
when Gordon Slynn was practicing at the bar, then considers 
what has happened in the European Union (“EU”),1 and finally 
concludes by looking at the present position in England. 
I. ENGLISH LAW GOVERNING STATE LIABILITY WHEN 
SLYNN WAS PRACTICING AT THE BAR 
When I first came across Gordon Slynn forty years ago, he 
was regularly acting for the defendant U.K. government before 
the English courts, the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”). I tended to be 
 
*  Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
1. For the sake of simplicity I adopt the expression “Union” throughout this Essay, 
even if referring to what used to be the European Community. 
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on the other side and, even if I usually lost, always found him a 
quick-witted, charming, and stimulating opponent. 
At that time, English law had a reasonably well-developed 
system of remedies for putting an end to misfeasance and 
nonfeasance, but it was recognized to be deficient in providing 
adequate financial remedies for damages suffered by reason of 
misfeasance or nonfeasance.2 The idea that a claimant might be 
able to obtain damages for a legislative or judicial act hardly 
crossed anyone’s mind. 
Throughout his life, Gordon Slynn was keenly aware of what 
other jurisdictions might have to contribute towards finding 
answers in this field in which the essential tensions are the same 
throughout the world. Here are some examples, the first of 
which may cause a New York readership, in particular, to raise its 
collective eyebrow. 
Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office involved a party of seven boys 
who were committed to the lawful custody of the governor of a 
training institution for young criminals.3 The governor of this 
borstal institution sent the boys to Brownsea Island on a training 
exercise and gave three officers instructions to keep the boys in 
their custody and under their control.4 When the officers 
disobeyed these instructions and left the boys unsupervised, the 
trainees escaped. The boys proceeded to board a yacht that they 
found nearby.5 The yacht collided with the claimants’ nearby 
yacht. The collision, along with the boys’ other conduct, caused 
significant damage.6 The claimants sued the Home Office.7 In 
May 1970, the case came before the House of Lords on the 
“preliminary issue [of] whether the Home Office or these 
officers owed any duty of care to the claimants capable of giving 
rise to a liability in damages.”8 Slynn, then junior counsel, was 
acting for the Home Office, when the House of Lords answered 
 
2. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Sec’y of State for Trade & Indus., [1975] 
A.C. 295, 359 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Wilberforce, J., dissenting). 
3. Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office, [1970] A.C. 1004, 1026 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1025. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 1025–26. 
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that question in the affirmative.9 In an endeavor to persuade 
their Lordships to arrive at a different conclusion, Slynn referred 
them to Williams v. State of New York10 in vain. Lord Reid, the 
senior law lord at the time, and a much respected jurist, said: 
Finally I must deal with public policy. It is argued that it 
would be contrary to public policy to hold the Home Office 
or its officers liable to a member of the public for this 
carelessness—or, indeed, any failure of duty on their part. 
The basic question is: who shall bear the loss caused by that 
carelessness—the innocent [claimants] or the Home Office, 
who are vicariously liable for the conduct of their careless 
officers? I do not think that the argument for the Home 
Office can be put better than it was put by the Court of 
Appeals of New York in Williams v. State of New York: 
[P]ublic policy also requires that the State be not held 
liable. To hold otherwise would impose a heavy 
responsibility upon the State, or dissuade the wardens 
and principal keepers of our prison system from 
continued experimentation with ‘minimum security’ 
work details—which provide a means for encouraging 
better-risk prisoners to exercise their senses of 
responsibility and honor and so prepare themselves for 
their eventual return to society. Since 1917, the 
legislature has expressly provided for out-of-prison 
work, Correction Law, § 182, and its intention should 
be respected without fostering the reluctance of prison 
officials to assign eligible men to minimum security 
work, lest they thereby give rise to costly claims against 
the State, or indeed inducing the State itself to 
terminate this . . . salutary procedure. 
It may be that public servants of the State of New York are so 
apprehensive, easily dissuaded from doing their duty and 
intent on preserving public funds from costly claims that 
they could be influenced in this way. But my experience 
leads me to believe that Her Majesty’s servants are made of 
sterner stuff. So I have no hesitation in rejecting this 
argument. I can see no good ground in public policy for 
giving this immunity to a government department.11 
 
9. Id. at 1071. 
10. Williams v. New York, 127 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1955). 
11. Dorset Yacht, [1970] A.C. at 1032–33. 
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II. STATE LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
This Essay will return to English law later, but let us first 
accompany Slynn to Luxembourg where he also had to confront 
this type of problem not merely in the context of the liability of 
the state, but also in the context of what is now the EU. 
Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”) (article 288 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”)), which 
came into force on December 1, 2009, provides, in wording 
which has remained unchanged since 1957, “In the case of non-
contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, 
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants 
in the performance of their duties.”12 
A problem that has, from time to time, exercised the 
Union’s courts is whether it is possible to sue the Union with 
respect to a lawful, as opposed to unlawful, act. During his time 
as Advocate General at the ECJ, Slynn had to opine on such a 
claim made by a company that sold foodstuffs for piglets and 
alleged that it had suffered damages as a result of the enactment 
and implementation of certain European Commission 
(“Commission”) regulations. He said in his opinion: 
Lastly, on the law, Biovilac claims that even if the relevant 
acts of the Commission were lawful, it is nevertheless entitled 
to compensation. In so doing, it relies on the German legal 
concept of “Sonderopfer” (special sacrifice) and the 
equivalent French legal concept of “rupture de l’égalité 
devant les charges publiques” (unequal discharge of public 
burdens). By virtue of these concepts, an application for 
compensation may be brought with respect to a lawful act of 
the administration provided that the plaintiff can show that 
he has suffered particularly severe loss as a result of the 
act. . . . It seems to me that, as regards Community acts 
affecting a person’s business activities and causing economic 
 
12. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 340, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 193 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 288, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 147 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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loss, such an action, if existing at all, must be within a narrow 
compass.13 
He considered, and the Court accepted, that on the facts of 
that case, no such liability arose.14 However, the Court left open 
whether in principle any such action could lie in some 
circumstances.15 That position of ruling out liability in the case 
under review, but leaving the door open has been consistently 
followed by the Court ever since. 
A recent example is Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri 
Montecchio Spa (“FIAMM”).16 The complicated underlying facts of 
this case arose out of the “banana war” between the EU and the 
United States. The EU had, by regulation, taken various 
measures (the “banana measures”) against the importation of 
bananas, which measures were ruled unlawful by the appellate 
mechanisms of the WTO.17 As a result, the United States had, 
pursuant to provisions contained in the WTO regime, imposed 
various retaliatory restrictions on, among other things, the 
importation of batteries and spectacle cases from the EU into the 
United States (the “retaliatory measures”).18 These retaliatory 
measures had allegedly caused FIAMM and the Fedon company 
damage.19 For various reasons not presently relevant, the ECJ was 
not prepared to proceed on the basis that the banana measures 
were unlawful. FIAMM and others claimed that, even supposing 
that the banana measures had been lawful, the Union should be 
liable for doing something which had caused them substantial 
harm—notwithstanding the fact that neither of them had 
anything whatsoever to do with bananas—and they were the 
innocent victims of retaliatory measures taken by the United 
States.20 
 
13. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, SA Biovilac NV v. Eur. Econ. Cmty., Case 
59/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, 4091. 
14. Biovlac, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, ¶ 26. 
15. Id. ¶ 28. 
16. Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) v. 
Council, Joined Cases C-120 & C-121/06 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513. 
17. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
18. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶ 20. 
19. Id. ¶ 30. 
20. Id. ¶ 31. 
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In FIAMM, the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) held that the 
Community could, in principle, be liable without unlawfulness 
having been shown.21 It said in its judgment: 
When damage is caused by conduct of the Community 
institution not shown to be unlawful, the Community can 
incur non-contractual liability if the conditions as to 
sustaining actual damage, to the causal link between that 
damage and the conduct of the Community institution and 
to the unusual and special nature of the damage in question 
are all met.22 
However, the CFI held that on the facts of the case the Council of 
the European Union (“Council”) and Commission were not 
liable.23  
FIAMM and Fedon appealed.24 The Council and the 
Commission cross-appealed the ruling, arguing that there could 
be liability in principle for a lawful act. As to this, Advocate 
General Maduro, like the CFI, was in favor of giving a remedy in 
damages in some circumstances for a lawful act. He said: 
The establishment of a principle of no-fault Community 
liability could take its inspiration from the notion of the 
equality of citizens in bearing public burdens on which 
French administrative law has based liability for legislation. 
The reasoning may be summarised as follows: as all public 
activity is assumed to benefit society as a whole, it is normal 
that citizens must bear the resulting burdens without 
compensation, but if, in the general interest, the public 
authorities cause particularly serious damage to certain 
individuals and to them alone, the result is a burden that 
does not normally fall on them and which must give rise to 
compensation; the compensation, borne by society via 
taxation, restores the equality that has been upset. . 
This idea is not very far removed from the 
‘Sonderopfertheorie’ of German law, according to which 
individuals who, by reason of lawful public action, suffer a 
‘special sacrifice’, that is to say damage equivalent to 
expropriation, must be granted reparation. Presented in this 
 
21. Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) v. 
Council, Case T-69/00, [2005] E.C.R. II- 5393. 
22. Id. ¶ 160. 
23. Id. ¶ 214. 
24. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶ 1. 
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manner, no-fault Community liability could also be based on 
property rights, which are protected in the Community legal 
system as a general principle of law in accordance with the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It 
would express the idea that even lawful action by the 
Community’s legislative body cannot have an effect 
equivalent to expropriation without compensation being 
granted.25 
In a footnote to this passage, referring to the citation above from 
Biovilac, he says, “For an early example of such an insight, see the 
Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn in Biovilac v. 
EEC”26—an indication of the fact that Slynn’s influence is still felt 
many years after his departure from the Court. Another 
indication, of course, is that his former Legal Secretary, Eleanor 
Sharpston, is now an Advocate General at the ECJ. 
On the cross-appeal in FIAMM, notwithstanding the opinion 
of its Advocate General, the ECJ pursued its normal cautious 
course and, while leaving open the possibility that in some 
circumstances there might be an award of damages in respect of 
an action which was lawful, refused in the instant case to approve 
any award. The Court said: 
[T]he Council has contended that the FIAMM and Fedon 
judgments should be set aside . . . on the ground that the 
Court of First Instance erred in law in establishing a 
principle of Community liability in the absence of unlawful 
conduct attributable to its institutions or, in any event, in 
holding that such a principle is applicable in the case of 
conduct such as that at issue in the case in point. 
. . . . 
It should be pointed out first of all that, in accordance with 
the settled case-law . . . the second paragraph of Article 288 
EC means that the non-contractual liability of the 
Community and the exercise of the right to compensation 
for damage suffered depend on the satisfaction of a number 
of conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of 
which the institutions are accused, the fact of damage and 
the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the 
damage complained of. 
 
25. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶¶ 62–63 
26. Id. ¶ 63 n.65 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, SA Biovilac NV v. Eur. 
Econ. Cmty., Case 59/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4057, 4091). 
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The Court has also repeatedly pointed out that that liability 
cannot be regarded as having been incurred without 
satisfaction of all the conditions to which the duty to make 
good any damage, as defined in the second paragraph of 
Article 288 EC, is thus subject . . . . 
. . . . 
The Court’s case-law enshrining, in accordance with the 
second paragraph of Article 288 EC, both the existence of 
the regime governing the non-contractual liability of the 
Community for the unlawful conduct of its institutions and 
the conditions for the regime’s application is thus firmly 
established. By contrast, that is not so in the case of a regime 
governing non-contractual Community liability in the 
absence of such unlawful conduct. 
. . . . 
[A]s regards the liability regime recognised in Community 
law, the Court, while noting that it is to the general 
principles common to the laws of the Member States that the 
second paragraph of Article 288 EC refers as the basis of the 
non-contractual liability of the Community for damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance 
of their duties, has held that the principle of the non-
contractual liability of the Community expressly laid down in 
that article is simply an expression of the general principle 
familiar to the legal systems of the Member States that an 
unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obligation to make 
good the damage caused. 
. . . . 
The Court has . . . held in particular that, in view of the 
second paragraph of Article 288 EC, the Community does 
not incur liability on account of a legislative measure which 
involves choices of economic policy unless a sufficiently 
serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of 
the individual has occurred . . . . 
It has further pointed out, in this connection, that the rule of 
law the breach of which must be found has to be intended to 
confer rights on individuals . . . . 
The Court has, moreover, stated that the strict approach 
taken towards the liability of the Community in the exercise 
of its legislative activities is attributable to two considerations. 
First, even where the legality of measures is subject to judicial 
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review, exercise of the legislative function must not be 
hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever 
the general interest of the Community requires legislative 
measures to be adopted which may adversely affect 
individual interests. Second, in a legislative context 
characterised by the exercise of a wide discretion, which is 
essential for implementing a Community policy, the 
Community cannot incur liability unless the institution 
concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits 
on the exercise of its powers. 
Finally, it is clear that, while comparative examination of the 
Member States’ legal systems enabled the Court to make at a 
very early stage the finding recalled in paragraph 170 of the 
present judgment concerning convergence of those legal 
systems in the establishment of a principle of liability in the 
case of unlawful action or an unlawful omission of the 
authority, including of a legislative nature, that is in no way 
the position as regards the possible existence of a principle 
of liability in the case of a lawful act or omission of the public 
authorities, in particular where it is of a legislative nature. 
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be 
concluded that, as Community law currently stands, no 
liability regime exists under which the Community can incur 
liability for conduct falling within the sphere of its legislative 
competence in a situation where any failure of such conduct 
to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon 
before the Community courts. 
. . . . 
It follows from all of the foregoing that, in affirming in the 
judgments under appeal the existence of a regime providing 
for non-contractual liability of the Community on account of 
the lawful pursuit by it of its activities falling within the 
legislative sphere, the Court of First Instance erred in law. 
However, two further points should be made. 
First, the finding in paragraph 179 of the present judgment 
is made without prejudice to the broad discretion which the 
Community legislature enjoys where appropriate for the 
purpose of assessing whether the adoption of a given 
legislative measure justifies, when account is taken of certain 
harmful effects that are to result from its adoption, the 
provision of certain forms of compensation . . . . 
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Second, it is to be remembered that it is settled case-law that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures. 
With regard, more specifically, to the right to property and 
the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, the Court has 
long recognised that they are general principles of 
Community law, while pointing out however that they do not 
constitute absolute prerogatives, but must be viewed in 
relation to their social function. It has thus held that, while 
the exercise of the right to property and to pursue a trade or 
profession freely may be restricted, particularly in the 
context of a common organisation of the market, that is on 
condition that those restrictions in fact correspond to 
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and 
that they do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference which 
infringes upon the very substance of the rights 
guaranteed . . . . 
It follows that a Community legislative measure whose 
application leads to restrictions of the right to property and 
the freedom to pursue a trade or profession that impair the 
very substance of those rights in a disproportionate and 
intolerable manner, perhaps precisely because no provision 
has been made for compensation calculated to avoid or 
remedy that impairment, could give rise to non-contractual 
liability on the part of the Community.27 
The Court, however, found that there was in the instant case no 
infringement of any right to property. 
Turning, now, to the state’s liability for unlawful acts, it is 
worth noting that during Sir Gordon Slynn’s time as a member of 
the European Court of Justice he was a party to the famous 
decision in Francovich and Others,28 which affirmed the liability of 
the state for damages caused to an individual by the state’s failure 
to transpose a community directive. The Court said: 
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired 
and the protection of the rights which they grant would be 
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when 
their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for 
which a Member State can be held responsible. 
 
27. FIAMM, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513, ¶¶ 161, 164–65, 167, 170, 172–76, 179–84. 
28. Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 5357. 
  
1558 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1548 
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is 
particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full 
effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on 
the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence 
of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the 
national courts the rights conferred upon them by 
Community law. 
It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable 
for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of 
breaches of Community law for which the State can be held 
responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty. 
. . . . 
Where, as in this case, a Member State fails to fulfil its 
obligation under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the 
Treaty to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result 
prescribed by a directive, the full effectiveness of that rule of 
Community law requires that there should be a right to 
reparation provided that three conditions are fulfilled. 
The first of those conditions is that the result prescribed by 
the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals. 
The second condition is that it should be possible to identify 
the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of 
the directive. Finally, the third condition is the existence of a 
causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation and 
the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties. 
Those conditions are sufficient to give rise to a right on the 
part of individuals to obtain reparation, a right founded 
directly on Community law.29 
In Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Factortame, those principles were 
held to be applicable to German and U.K. legislation enacted in 
breach of EU law obligations.30 In Köbler v. Austria, it was held 
that the principle of liability on the part of a Member State for 
damages caused to individuals as a result of breaches of 
Community law for which the state is responsible could be 
applied to any authority of the Member State whose act or 
omission was responsible for the breach, including a supreme 
court of a Member State adjudicating at last instance.31 
 
29. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 39–41. 
30. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany, Joined Cases C-46 & C-48/93, [1996] 
E.C.R. I-1029, ¶¶ 18–20. 
31. Köbler v. Austria, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. 239, ¶¶ 30–50. 
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III. CURRENT ENGLISH LAW GOVERNING STATE LIABILITY 
When Slynn returned to England in 1992, he joined the 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.32 In 1996, he found 
himself in a minority when deciding the case Stovin v. Norfolk 
County Council.33 Stovin had been injured in a highway accident at 
a dangerous junction.34 The council knew the junction was 
dangerous and the deficiency could have been rectified for less 
than UK£1000.35 Had this been done, the accident would not 
have happened. After Stovin sued the council, Lords Slynn, 
Nicholls, and the courts below were in favor of allowing Stovin to 
recover.36 However, the majority in their Lordships’ House 
denied Stovin any remedy. Lord Hoffman, with whom the 
remainder of their Lordships agreed, said, echoing the thoughts 
expressed by the New York Court of Appeals cited at the 
beginning of this Essay: 
[T]he creation of a duty of care upon a highway authority, 
even on the grounds of irrationality in failing to exercise a 
power, would inevitably expose the authority’s budgetary 
decisions to judicial inquiry. This would distort the priorities 
of local authorities, which would be bound to try and play 
safe by increasing their spending on road improvements 
rather than risk enormous liabilities for personal injury 
accidents. They will spend less on education or social services 
. . . [I]t is important, before extending the duty of care owed 
by public authorities, to consider the cost to the community 
of defensive measures which they are likely to take in order 
to avoid liability.37 
Subsequently, Lord Slynn delivered leading opinions in 
Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield38 and Phelps v. London Borough 
 
32. Lord Slynn of Hadley, TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/law-obituaries/5127036/lord-slynn-of-
hadley.html. 
33. Stovin v. Norfolk County Council, [1996] A.C. 923 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
34. Id. at 923. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 958. 
38. Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 550 (H.L) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
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of Hillingdon,39 in which the same sort of issues and the 
interrelationship between public law liability and liability in the 
tort of negligence arose in the context of the possibility of 
striking out actions as disclosing no cause of action, and in which 
the possibility of successful actions was left open.40 
A more clear-cut result can be seen in R v. Factortame, where 
the House of Lords, affirming the lower courts, held that the 
United Kingdom was liable in damages for its enactment of the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 in breach of community law.41 
Lord Slynn delivered the leading judgment. Lord Hoffman, this 
time agreeing with Lord Slynn, said: 
The question is now whether they are entitled to 
compensation. The Court of Justice has ruled that this 
depends upon whether the breach of Community law was 
sufficiently serious. It accepts that in principle the area in 
which the United Kingdom was legislating was one in which 
it had a wide discretion. In such a case, the breach of 
Community law will be sufficiently serious only if the 
legislature “manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of 
its discretion.” 
I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Slynn of 
Hadley that the actions of the United Kingdom can properly 
be so described. There is no doubt that in discriminating 
against non-U.K. Community nationals on the grounds of 
their nationality, to which the requirements of domicile and 
residence were added to tighten the exclusion of non-U.K. 
interests, the legislature was prima facie flouting one of the 
most basic principles of Community law. The responsible 
Ministers considered, on the basis of the advice they had 
received, that there was an arguable case for holding that the 
United Kingdom was entitled to do so. In that sense, the 
Divisional Court has held that the Government acted bona 
fide. But they could have been in no doubt that there was a 
substantial risk that they were wrong. Nevertheless, they saw 
the political imperatives of the time as justifying immediate 
action. In these circumstances, I do not think that the 
 
39. Phelps v. Hillingdon London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 619 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
40. See the valuable discussion in DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT 
46–51 (2003). 
41. R. v. Sec’y of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 5), [2000] 1 
A.C. 524 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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United Kingdom, having deliberately decided to run the risk, 
can say that the losses caused by the legislation should lie 
where they fell. Justice requires that the wrong should be 
made good.42 
In 2008, the Law Commission for England and Wales issued 
consultation paper number 187, entitled Administrative Redress: 
Public Bodies and the Citizen,43 which is of interest to a wider 
audience. The Law Commission, following a couple of decades 
and more of criticism,44 took the view that English law in this area 
was unsatisfactory.45 Some of the reasons for this arise from the 
English rules governing judicial review, and others from the 
English traditions of: (1) not allowing a remedy for breach of 
statutory duty unless the statute provides for this and the breach 
is of a kind contemplated by the statute,46 (2) having a variety of 
torts rather than an overarching principle governing all torts,47 
and (3) requiring the existence of a duty of care before any 
recovery could be had for negligence.48 It is not, however, 
appropriate to examine these in the context of this contribution. 
What is presently of most interest in the Essay, as indicating 
a viewpoint formed, in part, by looking outside the United 
Kingdom, is the following: 
Our provisional view is that judicial review has developed in a 
way that is over restrictive in relation to the award of 
damages to an aggrieved citizen. 
. . . . 
What is clear from the discussion above is that the area is 
uncertain to such an extent that it requires frequent appeal 
to the House of Lords. While underlying considerations such 
as liability creating an undue burden for public bodies can 
be determinative in some instances, they are not in others. 
What cannot be ignored is that the Human Rights Act 1998 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
 
42. Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted). 
43. THE LAW COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS: PUBLIC BODIES AND THE 
CITIZEN, 2008, Consultation Paper No. 187 [hereinafter REDRESS], available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/ cp187_web.pdf. 
44. See, e.g., MICHAEL FORDHAM, JUDICIAL REVIEW HANDBOOK 312–13 (5th ed. 
2004). 
45. REDRESS, supra note 43, at 111. 
46. Id. at 32. 
47. Id. at 31. 
48. Id. at 37. 
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Rights are starting to affect liability of public bodies in 
negligence to an ever increasing extent and exert a distinct 
pressure to expand liability. 
In considering how to move forward and react to the 
competing demands of claimants and public bodies it is 
important to bear in mind the two salient issues that come 
out of the above analysis: 
(1) Recent history has seen an increase in 
governmental liability and there seems little to suggest 
that this increase will halt or that the extent of liability 
will decrease. 
(2) The jurisprudence on the law of negligence, 
particularly relating to the liability of public bodies, is 
complicated and uncertain to such an extent that 
outcomes are difficult to predict. 
It does not seem desirable to leave the system in present 
state. This would serve neither the interests of public bodies 
nor those of claimants. 
. . . . 
It is clear that negligence has developed in an unpredictable 
manner, leaving the law so uncertain that the House of 
Lords has frequently been called upon to readdress key areas 
of liability. Our provisional view is that both breach of 
statutory duty and misfeasance in public office fail to meet 
the requirements of a just system that properly balances the 
interests of claimants against those of public bodies in a clear 
and predictable manner. In both public and private law, it 
provisionally appears to us, there is a lack of any underlying 
principle or foundational structure that could lead to a 
simpler and more predictable system. This serves neither the 
interests of claimants nor those of public bodies. 
. . . . 
We provisionally propose to allow the recovery of damages in 
judicial review if the claimant satisfies the elements of 
conferral of benefit, “serious fault” and causation, which are 
set out in detail below. In our provisional view, this is a 
natural development in the law, considering that damages 
for breach of EU law and under the Human Rights Act 1998 
are currently available. Furthermore, we do not believe that 
such a development would impose a substantial burden on 
public bodies. 
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. . . .  
Our suggested approach in private law is to place certain 
activities which are regarded as “truly public” in a specialised 
scheme where, in order to establish liability, the claimant 
would have to prove the same elements as in the public law 
scheme. The effect would be to restrict liability in some areas 
and widen the potential for liability in others. This reflects 
our attempts to strike a balance between the following 
competing demands: 
(1) Allowing citizens to obtain redress where they are 
adversely affected by the acts or omissions of a public 
body in a wider range of governmental activity than is 
currently the case in private law; and 
(2) Appreciating that public bodies are subject to a 
wide range of competing demands and are thus in a 
special position. This means that imposing general 
negligence liability may not be in the interests of justice 
as it could adversely affect the activities of the public 
body and therefore harm the general public.49 
Legislators and judges in the United Kingdom have, over 
the last forty years, been increasingly conscious of legal 
developments on the continent of Europe and have seen the 
merit of some of them. They, like other mortals, tend to react to 
the stimuli to which they are exposed. One of these was Lord 
Slynn. The advantage he had was that, by reason of his French 
wife, his wide exposure to a number of different jurisdictions, 
and his own indefatigable taste for travel and for meeting 
scholars from all over the world, his own mind had considerable 
breadth. Others have benefited from it. 
 
49. Id. at 60, 67, 75–76. 
